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1  In t r o d u c t io n
Money laundering is commonly referred to  as the  act or process whereby the 
proceeds of crime are transform ed into apparently legitim ate money or other 
assets. More specifically, conversion or transfer of property, concealment or 
disguise of the  nature of the  earnings, the  acquisition, possession or use of 
property, being aware th a t these are derived from criminal activity and par­
ticipation or assistance in the  movement of illicit funds to  make them  appear 
legitim ate signify illegal activities considered laundering money (Duhaime, 
2014).
Considered by many a  global th rea t to  free m arket economies and w ith 
a  substantial effect on the international financial system, money laundering 
has shown to  be challenging in estim ation and effective in camouflage. Thus, 
the  intergovernmental board of The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
established in 1989 to  a  certain extent w ith one objective : to  set standards 
and implement policies which directly or indirectly combat money laundering 
by legal, regulatory and operational means.
Several studies have been conducted in pursuance of a  thorough investi­
gation regarding this phenomenon which has shown no t to  be a  rare event 
in recent decades. An examination of m ajor corruption cases over recent 
years shows th a t significant am ounts of illicit financial flows from develop­
ing countries have found their way into OECD countries (OECD, 2014). 
According to  an official report from the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC), in 2009 criminal proceeds am ounted to  3.6 percent of 
global GDP, w ith 2.7 percent or USD 1.6 trillion being laundered.
This thesis' prim ary purpose is to  investigate through empirical analysis 
w hether the so-called money laundering might represent an  im portant deter­
m inant for foreign direct investment outward position. P ast investigations 
suggest th a t  there exists evidence indicating significance of the money laun­
dering factor driving outward foreign direct investment (Atems & Mullen, 
2016; Perez e t al., 2012).
To investigate th is m atter I utilize a  sample of six European reporting
2
countries which also are members of The Organization for Economic Co­
operation and Development (O ECD ). Germany, France, Italy, United King­
dom of G reat B ritain and Northern Ireland, Sweden and Netherlands are 
officially considered developed economies by the  United Nations institutions 
and are mainly concentrated in the  unofficial regional group of W estern Eu­
ropean countries.
The prim ary motive for bringing to  the focus of my study these countries 
is to  conduct a  comprehensive analysis on sophisticated European economies 
of the W estern region w ith high level of development, because similar existing 
studies are lim ited to  results for Central European countries, ASEAN region, 
economies still in transition or for one specific country such as the  United 
States (Perez e t al., 2012; Nugraha, 2013; Atems & Mullen, 2016).
The study is based on the  foreign direct investment outward positions of 
6 cross-sections reporting outward FD I to  more than  130 host economies, 
depending on d a ta  availability provided by the  OECD statistics on bilateral 
FD I positions. I t  employs an  unbalanced panel d a ta  for the tim e period 
between 2001 and 2012. The m ain contribution of the  paper would be to  
use the gravity model approach which up to  my knowledge has no t been 
used yet to  estim ate the  relationship between FD I and money laundering. 
Secondly the  paper would add more evidence explicitly for highly developed 
European countries and from recent years regarding the investigation of 
money laundering.
Overall empirical results show th a t for th is particular group of countries, 
money laundering may not be an im portant determ inant for investments 
abroad. However, when estim ations are performed to  two smaller subsam­
ples of developed and developing host countries, a  clear difference is ob­
served. Interestingly, for developed economies evidence suggests a  positive 
relationship among FD I and money laundering. O n the other hand, for 
developing economies money laundering does no t seem to  determine signifi­
cantly FD I. These results could be explained by the  fact th a t the  volume of 
d a ta  and specifically of positive FD I values is higher for developed destina­
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tions. Also, examining the  list of m a jor money laundering countries through 
the  years, a  great proportion consists of advanced economies.
Nevertheless, drawbacks of large FD I datasets should be taken into con­
sideration firstly because it  may be challenging to  compare the information 
among different jurisdictions and secondly because a  large number of coun­
tries are represented only as mediators in receiving or investing FD I which 
may invalidate the  reported information. Lastly, missing d a ta  and non­
positive values may also be of high influence to  the  outcome. So in general 
results should be seen w ith a  certain level of skepticism.
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2  L i te ra tu re  R e v ie w
An overview of previous literature regarding the  topic s tarts  w ith the  origin 
and progress of the  G ravity model of trade which remains crucial to  un­
derstand patterns of international flows. Its lim itations and drawbacks are 
also presented. This section is followed by an  elaborate definition of foreign 
direct investment and briefly by their im portance to  the  global economy. 
Furtherm ore, the  gravity model of FD I is presented and explored through 
several studies th a t detect traditional gravity factors as m ain explanatory 
variables of FD I. M entioned papers also analyze destination country char­
acteristics and country pair similarities as potential determ inants of foreign 
direct investment.
The assessment of traditional gravity determ inants is succeeded by a  short 
review of unconventional factors th a t determ ine FD I such as tax  havens, 
corruption, transparency etc. Furtherm ore, the process of money launder­
ing is introduced complemented w ith global statistics from past empirical 
works which focus on its quantification. Lastly and m ost im portantly, papers 
studying the  relationship of money laundering and FD I are examined. Their 
methodology, empirical results and some noted lim itations are summarized.
2.1 T he  G rav ity  M odel
In  international economics, the  gravity model is preferred by many re­
searchers who a ttem p t to  examine and understand the  patterns of trade 
between countries. This approach was initially presented by Tinbergen 
(1962). He introduced his study as an  analogy w ith Newton's universal 
law of gravitation which states th a t  the  force of gravity between two objects 
is proportional to  the  product of the  masses of the  two objects divided by the 
square of the  distance between them . In trade, Tinbergen replaced the  force 
of gravity w ith the  value of bilateral trade and the  masses of two objects 
w ith Gross Domestic P roducts of two countries. He concluded th a t bilateral 
trade flows among two countries are positively correlated to  bo th  their gross 
domestic products and negatively affected by distance between them .
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The relationship was commonly specified by the  following equation:
P X . j  =  ' ' ' Y D < j A ' Ui j
where P X i j  is the  US dollar nominal value of bilateral trade between country 
i and country j, Y i and Y j  are respective values of Nominal GDP-s, D i j  
is the  distance from the  economic center of i to  the  economic center of 
j and A i j  represents any other factors motivating or discouraging trade. 
u i j  is a  log-normally distributed error term  with expected value being zero 
(J . H. Bergstrand, 1985).
In the 1970-s and 1980-s, the  relatively straightforward approach was 
partly  seen as extensively empirical and w ithout any significant founda­
tion on previous theoretical models of trade (Deardorff, 1984; Aitken, 1973; 
Geraci & Prewo, 1977; Abrams, 1980). Theoretical heritage proposed dif­
ferent explanations of trade flows. For instance, the famous Ricardian and 
Heckscher-Ohlin models did no t consider the size of the  economy as a  deter­
mining factor for trade. Instead, their ideas focused on factor endowment 
differences between countries, no t being able to  build a  theoretical connec­
tion between bilateral trade and characteristic factors of production.
Despite contradicting opinions and academic papers from economists, it  
has been generally agreed th a t the gravity equation has dem onstrated to  
be a  robust empirical finding in economics w ith high statistical explanatory 
power (E venett & Keller, 1994). Many researchers a ttem pted  to  improve 
the  model in order to  eliminate various issues coming w ith employing only 
the  intuitive first approach. The 'new gravity theory ' suggested th a t the 
gravity model could be easily derived from very different models, including 
the  Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin and Increasing Return to  Scale (IRS) models 
(Anderson, 1979; Helpman & Krugm an, 1985) contributing w ith the  first 
theoretical foundation to  the  Tinbergen model.
G ravity w ith G ravitas model of Anderson & van W incoop (2003) is con­
sidered a  revolution in the  gravity model theory because of its  solid microe­
conomic foundations. The authors implement a  dem and function into the
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gravity model specifically by adding a  modified function of constant elastic­
ity  of substitution. According to  their model, utility  of consumers increases 
w ith consumption of either a  wider variety of goods or from consuming more 
of a  given good. Meanwhile, their production side follows the  assumptions 
of Krugm an (1979). In th is respect, the  progress of theoretical foundations 
for the  gravity model of trade since 2003 is im portant in general for interna­
tional flows b u t differs from the micro-founded gravity models of FD I which 
will be explained in the  following subsection.
2.2 Foreign d irec t investm ent: D efinition an d  S ta tistics
Foreign Direct Investment (FD I) flows are frequently defined as the value of 
cross-border transactions related to  direct investment during a  given period 
of tim e, usually a  quarter or a  year. Equity transactions, reinvestment of 
earnings, and inter-company debt transactions comprise the  financial flows 
which by direction are distinguished into outward and inward investment 
flows. Outward flows represent transactions th a t increase the investment 
th a t  investors in the  reporting economy have in enterprises in a  foreign econ­
omy, such as through purchases of equity or reinvestment of earnings, less 
any transactions th a t decrease the  investment th a t  investors in the reporting 
economy have in enterprises in a  foreign economy, such as sales of equity or 
borrowing by the resident investor from the  foreign enterprise. Inward flows 
represent transactions th a t increase the  investment th a t foreign investors 
have in enterprises resident in the  reporting economy less transactions th a t 
decrease the  investment of foreign investors in resident enterprises. FD I 
flows are measured in USD and as a  share of G D P (OECD, 2018).
According to  the  International M onetary Fund, a  transfer or transaction 
of financial flows is considered a  foreign direct investment when an individ­
ual or business is the  owner of 10 percent or more of a  foreign company. 
Otherwise, the  International M onetary Fund defines i t  as p a rt of his or her 
personal stock portfolio. I t  could be noted th a t a  ten  percent ownership does 
no t give the  investor the  holding of a  m a jority of the  stock of a  business, re­
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stricting the holder from exercising control. However, it  does allow influence 
over the  corporate m anagement, operations and policies and thus, govern­
m ents usually ought to  track every investment in their country's businesses 
(IM F, 2004).
In 2016, the  United Nations reported a  value of 1.75 trillion dollars global 
FD I declining roughly 2 percent from 2015's flows worth of 1.76 trillion 
dollars (UNCTAD, 2016). Key political and economic institutions emphasize 
the  im portance of FD I to  the  global economy and construct policies th a t  may 
act as incentives for its  overall rise. The European Commission views these 
investments as a  m ain driver of competitiveness and economic development 
because it  brings capital, diversification and rising living standards especially 
to  the  host economies (European Commission, 2015).
2.3 G rav ity  m odel of F D I an d  its  m ain  de te rm inan ts
Several models have been used as a  baseline for the investigation of for­
eign direct investments. G ravity model is a  particular m ethod commonly 
referred to  for observing both  foreign direct investment and trade patterns 
concerning direction and relevant determ inants. The m ost current studies 
and economic papers have controlled for additional variables of interest in 
their econometric analysis through the gravity equation to  assess their rela­
tive effect on foreign direct investment flows or stocks.
In contrast to  the  im portant recent improvements in the  micro-foundation 
structure of the  trade gravity model, there is lim ited progress for building a  
theoretical ground to  explain through i t  the  movement of FD I.
However, some a ttem pts include an im portant study from J . Bergstrand 
& Egger (2007) who derive a  gravity model for FD I from the  knowledge cap­
ita l theory of horizontal m ulti-national enterprises. Their ob jective is a  full 
general equilibrium model th a t can explain foreign direct investment,besides 
trade and foreign affiliate sales. The theoretical model being simulated gen­
erates nonlinear relationships between exports, affiliate sales and their exoge­
nous determ inants. The approxim ate ‘empirical' relationship is afterwards
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fitted to  the generated d a ta  which take the same relationship to  actual da ta , 
w ith some success.
Over the  last decade, the  popularity of FD I flows gravity models has risen 
despite m any obstacles in constructing the  model itself and the  d a ta  being 
vulnerable to  im portant single events (Folfwas, 2011). Numerous authors 
have examined the effect of the  core explanatory factors and additional micro 
and macro-founded variables (Brenton e t al., 1999; Stone & Jeon, 1999; 
Kahouli & M aktouf, 2015).
Bevan & Estrin  (2004) perform a  comprehensive examination of FD I de­
term inants by analyzing a panel dataset of foreign direct investment outflows 
from W estern European countries to  Central and Eastern European ones. 
The resulting significant factors appear to  be m arket size and distance as 
the  gravity model predicts. Additionally, their empirics suggest th a t  unit 
labor costs and also announcements about EU Accession proposals have an 
im portant effect on FD I. Interestingly, host country risk statistically proves 
no t to  be a  meaningful determ inant. However, their dataset covers the  pe­
riod 1994-2000 w ith incomplete information on flows to  transition countries. 
For instance, the  d a ta  on Greece flows to  Poland are restricted only for 1996 
to  1998 and Ireland omits Estonia and Latvia. The authors also address 
many gaps which according to  them  indicate zero flows and several missing 
values e.g. Finnish flows to  Poland in 1994.
Similar discrepancies occur to  Blonigen & Davies (2002) exploring the 
im pact of tax  treaties on FD I for OECD members over a  ten  year period 
1982-1992. However, the  gravity model variables seem to  have a  considerable 
effect as the  theoretical framework predicts. Eaton & Tam ura (1996) imply 
th a t investment is closely related to  the  destination country characteristics 
including m arket size, cost of investment, level of development and trans­
portation  costs. Their dataset is restricted for Japanese and US flows to  host 
countries, for a  five year period 1985-1990. Their 'modified gravity model' 
controlling for various host country specifics such as population, income, the 
land-labor ratio , the  average level of education and region,suggests th a t po­
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tential gravity factors are consistent w ith the  theory. Lastly, Frenkel e t al. 
(2004) also strongly supports using the  classic gravity explanatory variables
as a  baseline for investigating FD I flows.
Mihci et al. (2011) are particularly interested in outward FDI determi­
nants for the EU-12 group of countries. Their results using the gravity ap­
proach put great importance to cost related factors and potential demand, 
bu t it should be noted th a t their study is particularly focused on industry 
differences. Thus, the dataset and the empirical specification are constructed 
mainly for industry levels.
2.4 N on-trad itional de te rm inan ts of investm ent decisions: ta x  
havens, co rrup tion , financial transparency , globalization
The rising level of globalization and technology in various spheres of the 
world's economy and development has brought many benefits to today's 
complex economic system bu t also several drawbacks. Modern mechanisms 
and institutions tend to facilitate today's business and financial transactions 
in order to create an incentive for openness, trade activity and generate 
more value which may translate into growing capital and prosperity for the 
countries and jurisdictions involved. On the other hand, various reports show 
a dram atic increase in paper entities or companies th a t don't demonstrate 
any type of business activity which add up to more than  2 million including 
banks, funds and insurance companies (The Economist, 2013).
One potential explanation, as argued by many authors, would be the ris­
ing number of investors th a t may rely on offshore finance for the expansion 
of wealth and capital. The term  'offshore financial centers' (OFC) is defined 
by the International M onetary Fund (IMF) as “jurisdictions th a t have rela­
tively large numbers of financial institutions engaged primarily in business 
with non-residents”, ”financial systems with external assets and liabilities 
out of proportion to domestic financial intermediation designed to finance 
domestic economies”  and more popularly as ” centers which provide some 
or all of the following services: low or zero taxation; m oderate or light fi­
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nancial regulation; banking secrecy and anonymity”  (IM F, 2000). In  fact, 
over the past three decades, overall dem and for information regarding these 
so-called secrecy jurisdictions kept increasing w ithout any significant inter­
vention from authorities and respective law-enforcement institutions up until 
the  late 1990-s (T he Economist, 2013).
Being able to  explain completely the  large flows of funds to  these jurisdic­
tions remains a  challenge th a t requires access to  information which unfor­
tunately  does no t appear to  be available neither to  the  general public or to  
concerning parties. Despite d a ta  lim itations, there exists evidence showing 
th a t OFC-s represent an  attractive destination for financial flows motivated
predominantly because of tax  deductions or to ta l tax  avoidance (Haberly
& Wojcik, 2015), financial transparency (Drabek & Payne, 2002), money 
laundering (Walker, 1999; Perez et al., 2012). Thus, beyond studying the 
standard driving forces of FDI, recent research suggests some non-traditional 
factors influencing flows in disguise.
An empirical research on FD I conducted through the gravity model shows 
tax  havens commonly defined as ”jurisdictions th a t have a low rate of tax  
or do not levy a tax  as well as offer some degree of secrecy (The Guardian, 
2011)” ,w ith asta tis tica le ffec to fa ro u n d 3 0 % o n in v es tm en td ec is io n s . The 
results of Haberly & Wojcik (2015) for year 2010 are based on IMF FDI 
stock data and strongly support the significance of gravity variables, most 
im portantly geographical distance. Furthermore, historical and political fac­
tors seem to play an im portant role in explaining FD I. However, the article's 
conclusions appear slightly over-generalized taking into account th a t the au­
thors utilize only cross-sections for 2010. Lastly, the authors conclude th a t 
OECD countries internalize considerable offshore FDI affecting developed 
economies and also emerging markets, despite the organization's agenda 
and policy-making against tax  evasion.
Another paper by Drabek & Payne (2002) shed light into a relatively 
new factor influencing foreign investors in the patterns and direction of their 
flows. They define their variable of interest as non-transparency which de­
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scribes a  set of government policies th a t  increase the  country's risk and level 
of uncertainty. According to  their model, the high risk and uncertainty 
mainly emerge from the  existence of corruption, instability in economic 
policy-making, the  poor property rights enforcement and institutional inef­
ficiencies. The rankings used to  construct the  variable consist of combining 
information regarding the level of corruption, law compliance, bureaucracy, 
contract viability and the  risk of government expropriation of private as­
sets. The transparency index is taken from publications of the  International 
C ountry Risk Guide for 52 countries.
They suggest, in line w ith their empirical results th a t the  country becomes 
to  some extent, less attractive because of non-transparency and the  effect of 
one point increase in the index would lead to  40 percent rise in FD I. The 
higher a  country's rank the more transparent their policies and institutions. 
The dataset also includes interest rates, GDP, inflation, to ta l investment, 
population, capital formation and employment levels. Nevertheless, taking 
into consideration th a t the sample covers only 4 years 1991-1995 and the 
au thors ' prim ary used econometric m ethod is fixed effects estim ation, short­
term  fluctuations might have biased the  results in a  certain degree.
Corruption is another particular phenomena which by representing a vari­
able on its own has brought m any interesting results and contributions into 
studying the determ inants of foreign direct investment. For instance, Eg­
ger & W inner (2006) dem onstrate evidence built on a  dataset th a t  refers to  
the  knowledge-capital model of m ultinational activity. The sample contains 
observations of 21 home countries which are generally known as developed 
economies and 59 host countries in bo th  developed and less developed cate­
gories for the tim e period 1983-1999. The outcome shows a  negative associ­
ation between FD I and corruption. However, its  im portance to  FD I seems 
to  be decreasing according to  the  paper's conclusions.
Alfaro e t al. (2005) show th a t during 1970-2000 low institutional qual­
ity  is the leading motive for the  lack of flows of capital from rich to  poor 
countries or the  so-called 'Lucas Paradox'. They perform cross-country OLS
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regressions on capital inflows which include the m ain categories of foreign 
direct investment (FD I), portfolio equity investment and debt inflows to  
obtain more comprehensive evidence.
Interestingly, globalization as an  independent factor has shown to  be im­
pactful to  the  direction of FD I flows. The particular starting  point of Bojnec 
& Ferto (2016) in investigating the effect of globalization is the knowledge- 
capital (K K ) model. The methodology differs in m any aspects from the 
gravity model and combines geographical variables, trade cost variables and 
factor endowment differences. M ost im portantly, the  KK model requires rel­
ative measures for the country sizes, one being the  sum of Origin and Host 
GDP-s (SU  M i j ) and the other representing the  following ratio:
1 - G D P i  G D P j
1 - S U  M i j  -  S U  M i j
The research is focused on OECD country members and also Turkey, seen
as a  crucial trader w ith the  organization b u t the d a ta  lim itations only allow
an analysis over the period 2004-2008.
2.5 M oney Laundering
The question whether money laundering is considerably reflected into fi­
nancial flows globally may have been answered already several times, but 
the issue of quantification remains problematic regarding the confidence of 
results. The la tter occurs mainly due to the fact th a t 'money-launderers' 
usually operate in a 'shadow economy' and manage large amounts of cash 
which are difficult to be tracked but easy to be transferred by means of 
bribing and connections. The proceeds from money laundering not only are 
challenging to be studied but in the m ajority of jurisdictions, they remain 
unknown even to the authorities due to the high level of disguise by which 
illicit flows are moved worldwide.
For 2000 alone, International M onetary Fund (IM F) together w ith the 
World Bank estimate th a t 2 to 4 % of the global gross domestic product 
(G D P) is created from illicit sources (Schneider, 2010). Agarwal & Agar­
wal (2004, 2006) argue by several regressions th a t global money laundering
13
am ounts to  more than  2.0 to  2.5 trillion US dollars annually or about 5-6 % 
of World G D P in 2006.
A few empirical works for estim ating the  direction and volume of money 
laundering use the  famous Walker model (1995). Its  theoretical foundations 
seem to  underly in the  Input-O utpu t (ten  R aa, 2009) model - typically used 
for economic modeling and planning b u t in an adjusted version for explaining 
international trade flows. Shortly, the  Leontief table is built on the logic th a t 
producer countries send their products and services to  consumer countries 
w hether they are “legal”  products and services or illegal ones. The “Total”  
column m ust be equal to  to ta l production in each country, and the  “Total”  
row m ust be equal to  the  to ta l consumption in each country.
The 'p ro to type ' Walker-Gravity model for money laundering is specified 
as following:
F i j  A ttractiveness j
M i  D istance i2j
where
F i j  =  G N P  (3B S j  + G A j  + S W I F T j  - 3C F j  - C R j  + 1 5 )
M i  capita D istance i j  2
F
where FMi j  represents the share of proceeds of crime th a t country i sends to  
country j, G N P /cap ita  is Gross N ational P roduct per capita, BS is Banking 
Secrecy, GA is Government A ttitude, SW IFT is a  dummy for being a  mem­
ber of Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication , C F 
is a  dummy for pair being in conflict, CR is Corruption. Bilateral distance 
is measured in kilometers between the  countries.
As seen from the specification of the  model, Walker (1995), S tam p & 
Walker (2007) and later on following studies specific to  A ustralia, Walker & 
Unger (2009) use crime proceedings and distinguish them  by different crime 
categories for estim ating w hat fraction represents money laundering. This 
approach seems reasonable and consistent in many aspects of economics 
of crime and according to  Walker & Unger (2009), i t  produces robust re­
sults. Nevertheless, the  model has been criticized for its  ambiguous findings. 
R euter (2013) appears to  suspect to  the  Walker methodology and claims th a t 
estim ates based on his model remain vague and not valid for generalizations.
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He argues th a t  information extracted on crime income does not represent a  
reliable source and any a ttem p t to  estim ate to ta l earnings from each illegal 
crime fails mainly due to  a  lack of system atic d a ta  systems for capturing the 
scale of each crime.
A ttem pts to  study the  patterns and outcomes of this phenomenon remain 
crucial to  the integrity and stability of the  financial sector and also to  the 
global economy. According to  IM F, illegal activities related to  money laun­
dering may discourage foreign investment, cause distortion to  international 
capital flows and result in significant welfare losses th a t would lead to  desta­
bilization of economic activities. Additionally, globalization and openness 
would facilitate the  effects to  be spread globally (IM F, 2018).
Moreover, Mcdowell e t al. (2018) argue th a t one of m any economic effects 
of money laundering is causing reputation risk. From a  global economy 
viewpoint, a  country whose financial institutions m ight be associated w ith 
money laundering activities is generally assigned high risk, uncertainty and 
low level of attractiveness.
Consequently, following th is economic rationale the  relationship of foreign 
direct investment to  money laundering ought to  be negative. This perspec­
tive is supported w ith empirical evidence by Nugraha (2013) focusing on 
the  ASEAN region. A positive significant relationship has been observed 
between FD I and the  existence of Financial Intelligence U nits (F IU ) in host 
countries for the  tim e period 2000-2009. The presence of FIU-s is associated 
w ith a  relatively higher control on money laundering activities and financial 
transactions related to  it.
O n contrast, another empirical effort to  investigate money laundering 
specifically through foreign direct investment by Perez e t al. (2012) presents 
contradicting evidence to  Nugraha (2013) th a t illicit flows which facilitate 
money laundering move throughout the financial system by foreign invest­
m ent. They use as econometric specifications the  Location Choice Model 
and Outflows Model, bo th  augmented versions of the  Knowledge-Capital 
Model (K K ) explained in section 2.3. for investigating the  effect of the
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variable representing centers of money laundering in FD I outward flows by 
adding additional independent variables such as host country tax  rates, gov­
ernance, corruption, and cultural differences between the home and host 
country. Their econometric approach follows the  nonlinear models of P rob it 
and Tobit.
Their exam ination is focused only on Central and Eastern European coun­
tries which are recognized by them  as transition economies. The authors 
compiled FD I outflows by country of destination for six countries : Bulgaria, 
the  Czech Republic, Estonia,Hungary, Macedonia and Slovenia. Because of
the  infrequency of some of these FD I flows, the  d a ta  on values of bilateral
FDI flows are restricted for the period 2000-2003. They commonly show 
th a t there are no bilateral FDI outflows between numerous home and host 
country pairs. Specifically, 62 percent of the FDI flows in their sample are 
zero. On average, their estimates show th a t 6 % to 10 % of to tal FDI out­
flows and over 20 % of FDI to money-laundering countries were made to 
facilitate illicit money flows (Perez et al., 2012).
Atems & Mullen (2016) study by a dynamic panel model the relationship 
between outward FDI and money laundering only for the United States. 
Their variable of interest is constructed in a similar m anner as by Perez et 
al. (2012) while they estim ate the regression by the Generalized M ethod of 
Moments (GMM). Their empirical findings for the time period 2002-2010 
indicate th a t money laundering opportunities a ttract FDI.
To summarize, from existing literature there are two main frames of refer­
ences to found presumptions. As suggested by Perez et al. (2012) and Atems 
& Mullen (2016), being a m ajor money laundering country is expected to 
significantly determine FDI with positive effect on it. On the other hand, 
Nugraha (2013) proposes th a t what considerably a ttracts  FDI is the higher 
control on money laundering. His conclusion relatively contradicts the for­
mer authors because it suggests th a t countries combating money laundering 
and not the ones which facilitate this process actually encourage foreign 
direct investment.
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However, these papers do not implement the G ravity Model approach 
to  study the  relationship of money laundering and FD I. Perez e t al. (2012) 
and Atems & Mullen (2016) ra ther focus either on the  Knowledge-Capital 
model which distinguishes between vertical and horizontal investment while 
Nugraha (2013) relies on a  simple panel linear model. Lastly, their evidence 
involves regions such as Central Eastern Europe, United States or Southeast 
Asia (ASEAN).
M otivated by the  above existing work on money laundering, th is paper 
examines its relationship to  FD I via the  G ravity model and the focus are 
highly developed economies concentrated mainly in the well-known W estern 
Europe.
The hypothesis to  be tested based on past findings remains: money laun­
dering reasons determine positively foreign direct investment.
3  M e th o d o lo g y  a n d  D a ta
Section 3 describes the  model including variables used for estim ation and 
its empirical specification to  analyze accordingly the  relationship of money 
laundering and FD I. Moreover, the  dataset utilized for obtaining inference 
is presented and sourced. Lastly, the econometric tools used for panel da ta  
in th is thesis are introduced which include pooled OLS, Fixed Effects and 
Random  Effects m ethods. Statistical tests to  compare between the  three 
m ethods are described. Their m ain assumptions are stated  and further ad­
vantages and drawbacks are explored. A few reasons for possible skepticism 
regarding obtained estim ates are also presented and other solutions for trea t­
ing zero FD I values are explored.
3.1 T he  M odel
The m ain inspiration for constructing my econometric model remains the
Gravity model of foreign direct investment used by authors such as Haberly
& Wojcik (2015); Blonigen & Davies (2002). The micro-founded approach of 
the FD I gravity model such as J. Bergstrand & Egger (2007) is not followed
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by th is paper mainly due to  its lim itations and because it shows to  be similar 
to  the  knowledge capital model which has already been used by previous au­
thors who investigate money laundering. Adding several additional variables 
th a t  are thought relevant for partly  explaining the  investment position has 
proven to  be relatively successful and has given interesting estim ates w ith 
statistically confident results (Bevan & Estrin , 2004; Blonigen & Davies, 
2002).
However, studies on money laundering being an independent variable and 
explaining foreign direct investment positions by th is approach are limited. 
As elaborated in Section 2.3 , the  gravity model enriched w ith variables 
of high significant explanatory power has only been used to  investigate the 
role of factors such as corruption, transparency, tax  havens, globalization etc. 
Thus, th is study adds money laundering as a  potential factor in explaining 
FD I.
Employing the particular variable of interest, namely the  binary categor­
ical variable 'being a  m a jor money laundering jurisdiction' was inspired by 
Perez e t al. (2012). Their study differs from my framework because they 
estim ate a  P rob it and Tobit econometric model w ith a  dependent variable 
defined as 'propensity of investors from country i to  invest in country j '.  Two 
specifications of the  model include the  location-choice model and the 'FD I 
outflow model'. Both combine relative country sizes, trade costs and factor 
endowment differences. Their panel dataset is lim ited to  only a  three year 
tim e period and the  jurisdictions which are considered as reporting countries 
are transition economies, p a rt of the  Central and Eastern European region.
The model specified in my thesis uses foreign direct investment positions 
of the outward direction from the reporting countries or origins to  destination 
countries as representatives for the  dependent variable. This is normally 
done because FD I flows reported by the  OECD statistical source, usually 
contain larger negative values which would be om itted or substitu ted  in 
order to  estim ate the baseline gravity variables.
The first specification of the  relationship to  bilateral flows in a  multi­
18
plicative form described in Section 2.1. of the  gravity model ought to  be 
adjusted to  a  regression equation to  be appropriately estim ated by linear 
econometric models. The log transform ation is applied to  the  dependent 
variable (FD I) and m ain gravity variables: distance and G D P of country 
pairs which control for the  size of the  economies.
The specification to  be estim ated is presented in Equation 1. Besides the 
gravity variables, the  basic model is usually enhanced by a  set of dummy 
variables which represent destination country characteristics or country pair 
similarities. The m ost frequent dummy variables among others are Common 
Language, Common Border, Colonial Relations, EU membership. These 
dummies also control for cultural and geographical barriers to  FD I. Their 
inclusion into the  model provides an additional explanation of possible un­
usual am ount of investment and an increase in the  significance of the  model. 
See for instance O h e t al. (2011)or NBERw16704.
lo g (fd i i j t )  =  ^ 0 +  fa logidistw i j t ) +  fclogigdp-O j t ) +  p 3 log(gdpjd i t )
■ ¡'i m l i t  +  Ps eo m lang^o ff i j  +  fte comrelig j  +  ^ c o lo n y ^  +  (1)
fecon tig i j  +  ^ geu-d i t +  P i o comcur i j t  +  P n e f i t  +  0t +  Vi j  +  u,j t
•  fdi (dependent variable) represents foreign direct investment positions 
or FD I stocks of origin countries to  host countries.
•  distw is the weighted distance between the  reporting or origin country 
which directly invests abroad and the  partner or destination country 
which receives the  investments.
•  gdp o is the  Gross Domestic P roduct of the origin country.
•  gdp d  is the Gross Domestic P roduct of the  host country.
•  comlang off is a  binary dummy which equals 1 if the  pair of countries
sharing bilateral investment have a  common official language and 0 
otherwise.
•  comrelig is the religious proximity in form of an index calculated by
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adding the  products of the  shares of Catholics, P ro testan ts and Muslims 
in the  origin and host country.
•  colony is a  dummy th a t equals 1 for pair ever in colonial relationship 
and 0 otherwise.
•  contig is a  dummy th a t equals 1 if the  country pair shares a  common 
border and 0 otherwise.
•  eu d  is a binary dummy which equals 1 if the  host country is a  European 
Union member and 0 otherwise.
•  comcur is a  binary dummy which equals 1 if the pair of countries share 
a  common currency.
•  ef represents the  Index of Economic Freedom for each host country. We 
use the  overall indicator which is based on 12 quantitative and quali­
tative factors divided into 4 categories : rule of law composed of prop­
erty rights, government integrity and judicial effectiveness ; government 
size which includes government spending, tax  burden and fiscal health; 
regulatory efficiency which evaluates business freedom, labor freedom, 
m onetary freedom and lastly open m arkets including trade  freedom, 
investment freedom, financial freedom. Each of the  twelve economic 
freedoms within these categories is graded on a  scale of 0 to  100. A 
country's overall score is derived by averaging these twelve economic 
freedoms, w ith equal weight being given to  each. The index is included 
in the  model to  control for any possible overestimation or incorrect sign 
of the  param eter of money laundering. I t  represents crucial economic 
indicators in the investment environment framework and may be sig­
nificant to  explain FD I according to  past studies (Fan e t al., 2009; Wei, 
2000).
•  ml is a  binary dummy which equals 1 if the partner country is considered 
a  'm a jor money laundering center of prim ary concern'.
•  Ot  represents the time specific effect. It is employed by dummy variables
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for each year. This allows the  model to  a ttribu te  p a rt of the variation 
of the  d a ta  to  unobserved events th a t occurred during each tim e period 
or characteristic features of particular years ra ther than  specific events. 
For instance, Bortoluzzo e t al. (2013) follows the  same approach when 
investigating FD I stocks. Adding these dummy variables controls for 
any possible effect of the  variation in exchange ra te . Also, the  tim e 
dummies deflate nominal values of GDP-s and control for possible global 
shocks. More generally, it  addresses tim e specific effects and aims to  
eliminate tim e trends.
•  Vi j  controls for the country pairwise effect and is represented by a 
dummy which equals 1 for each pair of countries. This would reflect 
the potential variability of observations among the 6 reporting coun­
tries since estimations are done on a pooled dataset for 6 reporting 
economies.
The main focus when constructing this model is to examine the impact of 
being a m ajor money laundering country on FD I outward stocks. All other 
factors are included to control for any other possible effect on FD I. In line 
with previous literature and findings (Perez et al., 2012; Atems & Mullen, 
2016), the following hypothesis is formulated.
Hypothesis 1 : Money laundering motives affect positively foreign direct 
investment outward positions.
The same hypothesis is tested for two subsamples : developed and devel­
oping countries to check for robustness of estimates and whether they differ 
depending on the level of development of host economies.
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3.2 D a ta
The sample of destination countries analyzed is not uniform from one re­
porting country to  another. An ID is assigned to  each pair of countries 
to  distinguish FD I coming from 6 origins for the  period of tim e 2001-2012. 
The panel dataset is unbalanced due to  d a ta  availability restrictions. More­
over, non-publishable, confidential values and non-positive observations in 
the  dependent variable have been om itted due to  its logarithmic form in the 
model. After applying these transform ations, estim ations are conducted on 
a  sample of 7014 observations for the  entire dataset.
Information on foreign direct investment positions has been retrieved from 
the  OECD statistics official website in section ”FD I statistics according to  
Benchmark Definition 3rd Edition (BM D3) - FD I positions by partner coun­
try ”. The values are reported in millions of US dollars for every pair to  
avoid inconsistencies. They essentially comprise every international invest­
m ent within the  balance of paym ent accounts where a  direct investor owns 
a  10 % ra te  or more of the  ordinary shares or voting rights of the enter- 
prise.They differ from the  accumulated flows because they are reevaluated 
taking into account inflation, exchange rates and other adjustm ents as for 
instance rescheduling or cancellation of loans or debt-equity swaps.
Bilateral distances, reported in kilometers and population weighted and 
also EU memberships are extracted from the  C E PII distance dataset con­
structed by Mayer & Zignago (2011). Gross Domestic P roducts are reported 
in current US dollars and extracted from the  World Development Indicators 
(T he World Bank, 2018).
Information on colonial relationship, common official language and con­
tiguity was taken from Head e t al. (2010), while dummies for the  common 
currency variable were constructed following De Sousa (2012).
The index of common religion was retrieved from Disdier & Mayer (2007) 
while the  Index of Economic Freedom is reported by Heritage Foundation 
(n .d .) for the  entire sample.
The independent variable representing money laundering includes obser-
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vations collected from the United S tates D epartm ent of S tate  website, for 
each year's International Narcotics Control Strategy R eport (INCSR). The 
review assesses the  im portance of financial transactions in the  country's fi­
nancial institutions including proceeds of serious crime, steps taken or not 
taken to  com bat financial crime and money laundering, each jurisdiction's 
vulnerability to  money laundering, the  conformance of its  laws and policies 
to  international standards, the  effectiveness and political actions taken from 
the  government.
The yearly reports identify money laundering priority jurisdictions and 
countries using a  classification system th a t consists of three categories: Ju ­
risdictions of Prim ary Concern, Jurisdictions of Concern, and O ther Ju ­
risdictions M onitored. ”Jurisdictions of Prim ary Concern”  are those th a t 
are identified,conditional to  INCSR reporting requirements, as m a jor money 
laundering countries (US D epartm ent of S tate). Any destination jurisdiction 
of my sample which is identified among th is list, is assigned a  ML dummy 
w ith value 1 and 0 if p a rt of any other category or no t listed a t  all.
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Table 1 summarizes the  names of the  variables, scales of values and the 
sources they were extracted from.
Table 1:
Variables
Abbreviation Name Scale Source
fdi foreign direct investment US $ millions OECD
distw distance kilometers Mayer & Zignago (2011)
gdp o G D P of origin current US $ World Bank
gdp d G D P of destination current US $ World Bank
comlang off common official language Dummy 0 or 1 Head & Ries (2008)
comrelig common religion Index 0-100 Disdier & Mayer (2007)
colony colonial relationship Dummy 0 or 1 Head & Ries (2008)
contig contiguity Dummy 0 or 1 Head & Ries (2008)
eu d EU membership Dummy 0 or 1 Mayer & Zignago (2011)
comcur common currency Dummy 0 or 1 De Sousa (2012)
ef economic freedom Index 0-100 Heritage Foundation
ml money laundering Dummy 0 or 1 US D epartm ent of S tate
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3.3 E conom etric approach
For estim ating the effect of the  money-laundering variable to  foreign di­
rect investment positions and for further investigations, 3 main econometric 
m ethods are employed: regular Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects.
Pooled OLS assumes th a t a  random  sample is drawn a t  each tim e period
and the  resulting d a ta  are independently pooled cross sections. Its  regular
OLS assumptions with estimators 3  =  (X 1X ) - 1 X ’Y involve:
•  A random sample is drawn.
•  Linear in param eters ¡ -s.
•  No perfect linear relationship among independent variables.
•  There is no correlation between disturbances and independent variables:
E(u i /X ) =  0
•  Homoskedasticity of error terms: Var(u i ) =  a 2
•  Normality of error terms: u i  follows the distribution N (0,a2 )
Ideally under the first five assumptions, OLS estimators are BLUE (best lin­
ear unbiased estimators) where ”best”  stands for the ones with the smallest 
variance. The increased sample size of pooled OLS produces more precise 
estim ators. Moreover, the effect of time could be controlled by adding year 
dummy variables in the model.
However, pooled OLS does not account for unobserved individual effects 
which if present in the model, produce biased and inconsistent results and 
estim ates. Despite this disadvantage, this m ethod is used for comparison to 
other panel data  methods of estimation in terms of coefficients, goodness of 
fit and statistical tests.
The two other methods used, Fixed Effects and Random Effects are part 
of a panel dataset approach. The rise in popularity of panel data methods is 
mainly dedicated to their larger source of information th a t allows to examine 
more complex observations and behavioral patterns of economic agents.
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According to  Baltagi (2005), panel d a ta  give more informative da ta , more 
variability, less collinearity among the  variables,more degrees of freedom 
and more efficiency. In  general, larger and more informative datasets may 
produce more reliable estim ates of coefficients. Moreover, panel d a ta  have 
proven to  be be tte r able to  study the dynamics of adjustm ent and lastly they 
are be tte r able to  identify and measure effects th a t  are simply not detectable 
in pure cross-section or pure time-series da ta .
One of the  m ost im portant advantages of panel d a ta  include controlling 
for heterogeneity of individuals, firms and countries. N ot controlling for the 
heterogeneity problem w ith time-series or cross-sectional datasets may run 
the  risk of getting biased results.
In Equation 2, a  panel d a ta  model is specified which takes the  effects of 
explanatory variables as invariant bo th  in tim e and a t  cross level, b u t the 
effects of om itted variables can be decomposed into individual, period or 
cross-section and period effects (Hsiao, 2007).
yi t  =  +  l3X i t  +  Ui t
for i=  1,...,N and t=  1, ...,T
where y i t  is the dependent variable, is the intercept, X i t  is a vector of K 
dimensions representing explanatory variables. The i subscript denotes the 
cross-section dimension whereas t denotes the time-series dimension.
The second panel data technique, Fixed Effects employs a one-way error 
component model for the disturbances, with u i t  =  +  vi t  where ^ i  de­
notes a time-invariant individual-specific unobserved effect and is referred 
to as unobserved or individual heterogeneity. vi t  denotes the idiosyncratic 
disturbance i.e. to be stochastic and independently identically distributed 
(0, -
Fixed Effects (FE) and specifically the ”W ithin”  m ethod estimates a de­
meaned model. It subtracts to each individual observation the average of 
the period, for each time-varying variable. As the fixed effect is constant, 
this m ethod eliminates . Therefore, in this case the issue of correlation
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between independent variables and the error term , which m ight cause severe 
bias in estimations is solved. Moreover, Fixed Effects is consistent in the  case 
of correlation between the  unobserved heterogeneity and a  time-varying de­
pendent variable. However, the  level of th is m ethod's performance depends 
to  an extent on the  variation of regressors over tim e, as estim ation uses de­
meaned da ta , i.e. the  tim e differences. Time invariant variables included in 
the  panel model are eliminated.
M ain assumptions of the  Fixed Effects m ethod require :
1. A random  sample in the cross sectional dimension.
2. S trict exogeneity i.e. for each tim e unit or period, the  expected value
of the  idiosyncratic error given the explanatory variables in all tim e
periods and the unobserved effect is zero: E(v i t j -/Xgp^ ) =  0
3. Each explanatory variable changes over time (for at least some i), and 
there are no perfect linear relationships among the explanatory vari­
ables.
Ideally under 1-3 being fulfilled, ft estimators are unbiased and as the 
number of observations gets larger, they become consistent.
Lastly, one drawback of the fixed effects could be th a t despite capturing 
entirely the time-constant om itted variables, the effect of any time-varying 
om itted variables would not be captured.
In Random Effects models, it is assumed th a t the time-invariant individual- 
specific effect fa  is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable at all periods 
x i t j  and Fixed Effects or First Differencing methods do not appear to be ef­
ficient because their transformations might eliminate significant information 
th a t fa  may contain. Im portant assumptions of Random Effects th a t have 
these implications are:
1. The expected value of ^ i  condition to all explanatory variables is zero: 
E (^ i /X i ) =  0. This rules out the correlation between the unobserved 
effect and explanatory variables.
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2. There are no perfect linear relationships among the  explanatory vari­
ables. This allows explanatory variables to  be constant over tim e for 
all i  i.e. individual cross-sections as opposed to  FE .
3. The variance of ^ i  given all explanatory variables is constant: 
V ar(^ i /X i ) =  a 2
S ta t is t ic a l te s ts
Comparisons among each mentioned econometric approach involve partic­
ularly their efficiency and consistency in estimation. Statistical tests for 
panel models described further are based on the work of Wooldrige (2003) 
and Baltagi (2005). For one to be able to test between Pooled OLS and 
Fixed Effects, a null hypothesis of individual specific heterogeneity is given 
and an F  test is performed calculating the Wald statistics. Rejecting the 
null hypothesis would imply th a t the individual heterogeneity exists in the 
model and pooling the d a ta  as a single regression w ith a single intercept is 
not appropriate while Fixed Effects deals w ith it accordingly and produces 
consistent estimates.
Additionally, Breusch Pagan Lagrange M ultiplier test is used to decide 
whether pooled OLS or Random  Effects performs better on this sample of ob­
servations. If the null hypothesis would not be rejected, statistical evidence 
indicates th a t the variance across individual entities is zero and therefore 
pooled OLS remains consistent w ithout the need of Random Effects.
L astly ,toexam inetheconsistencyofR andom E ffectsestim ates,theH aus- 
m an test is conducted. The null hypothesis states th a t Random  Effects es­
tim ates are consistent which implies th a t disturbances and regressors are 
independent of each other. If H 0 is not rejected, both Fixed Effects and 
Random  Effects are consistent but only Random Effects is efficient because 
it produces the smallest variance of disturbances. Under the alternative hy­
pothesis, endogeneity among independent variables exists and Fixed Effects 
is preferred.
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3.4 Om ission of zero F D I values
Initially, the set of FD I outward stocks collected from the  OECD statis­
tics website contained approximately 30% zero observations which officially 
represent no foreign direct investment. For th is paper, i t  was seen more 
appropriate to  om it these values in order to  log-transform the  dependent 
variable specified in the  regression equation as log(fdi) as it  remains one of 
the  suggested solutions by Bacchetta e t al. (2012).
There are several techniques treating zero observations in the dependent 
variable depending first and foremost on the assumption of randomness i.e. 
they are zero randomly and there is no other reason behind their value. 
Secondly, the econometric m ethod employed in the empirical analysis should 
be considered when dealing w ith these observations.
Commonly for foreign direct investment, the  occurrence of zero values is 
noticed to  be non-random. For instance, very d istan t and smaller destination 
economies in term s of G D P may receive typically zero investment positions 
from abroad. There is no clear pa tte rn  of zero values among m ajor money 
laundering countries and the  rest of the  destinations which receive FD I. 
However, their randomness cannot be definitely concluded.
In the  presence of heteroskedasticity, d a ta  which contain a  large volume 
of zeros usually cause the disturbance term  to  be substantial a t  very low 
values, violating the  assumption of normal distribution. I t  is usually pointed 
ou t th a t OLS estim ation of the  logarithmic transform ation of gravity model 
produces inconsistent results (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006).
One simple and commonly used way of how to  deal w ith zero values is 
adding a  small constant to  each observation and then perform the  logarith­
mic transform ation. Using log(y+constant) raises the issue of w hat constant 
should be added. One should be careful when choosing a  significantly small 
b u t positive value for it  because i t  m ight create substantial outliers in term s 
of the  transform ed response variable. For the  mentioned reasons, this solu­
tion is not implemented in th is paper.
Secondly, an  advanced solution to  th is problem would be the  Poisson
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Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood m ethod of estim ation which models the  error 
term  following the  Poisson distribution introduced by Santos Silva & Ten- 
reyro (2006). They estim ate the  gravity equation in the  multiplicative form. 
In  th is form, zero observations cause no problem. A part from solving the 
zero values issue, this approach yields consistent estim ates even though het- 
eroskedastic disturbances are present. O ther authors such as Head & Ries 
(2008) and Desbordes & Vicard (2009) also employ the Poisson model to  
estim ate gravity models of FD I.
Lastly, another alternative would be the  Tobit estim ation model which 
is specifically designed to  deal w ith corner solution dependent variables. I t  
was first employed on FD I by Eaton & Tam ura (1994) and is followed later 
by Wei (2000). However, the  m ethod relies heavily on the assum ption of 
homoskedasticity for unbiased estim ates (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006).
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Figure 1: Overview of FD I outward positions.
4  R e s u lts
4.1 Inference on  com plete d a ta se t
Figure 1 shows the distribution of FD I stocks originating from the 6 re­
porting countries between the  years 2001-2012. The highest values of FD I 
stocks b u t also the  m a jority of outliers in observations seem to  originate 
from the  United Kingdom which traditionally has shown similar patterns 
while Sweden's outward FD I has the  smallest reported investment abroad.
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Figure 2: Cross-correlations graph
An illustration of correlations among the  variables of the  model is dis­
played in Figure 2. Negative dependencies are colored in blue and positive 
ones in light or dark red. I t  shows clear positive correlation between FD I 
and GDP-s, country pair similarities represented by dummies, economic free­
dom and money laundering. Also foreign direct investment seems negatively 
correlated w ith distance as gravity model predicts.
I begin my econometric analysis w ith an F  test for individual specific 
heterogeneity in the  model which indicates whether pooled OLS or Fixed 
Effects estim ators should be used as elaborated in Section 3.3. Based on the 
p-value considerably lower than  5%, the null of no heterogeneity is rejected 
and i t  is concluded th a t pooled OLS is m ost likely biased and we prefer 
Fixed Effects.
Furtherm ore, the  Breusch-Pagan Lagrange M ultiplier te st is helpful to  
decide between pooled OLS and Random Effects m ethods. The null hy­
pothesis is rejected w ith a  p-value significantly lower than  0.05 which shows 
th a t there exist differences across units and Random Effects performs better
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th an  pooled OLS in th is case.
To make a  statistical comparison between Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects, one should consider their m ain assumptions and whether they are 
fulfilled or not. Random Effects assumes no endogeneity among independent 
variables, thus there is no correlation between the  unobserved individual 
effect and explanatory variables. To test th is assum ption, Hausm an test is 
performed. The null hypothesis H 0  states no endogeneity. Under H 0 ,  bo t 
Fixed Effects and Random  Effects are consistent b u t only Random  Effects 
is efficient. If H 0 is rejected, F E  is preferred because under the alternative 
i t  is consistent while R E is not. The resulting p-value of Hausm an test is 
considerably lower th an  0.05. Therefore, H 0  is rejected and F E  is preferred 
to  R E due to  its consistent estim ates.
Furtherm ore, the fulfillment of im portant linear assumptions is checked. 
To test whether disturbances are homoskedastic, a  Breusch-Pagan test is 
performed in R . The p-value is significantly lower th an  0.05, thus the  null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity of error term s is rejected. This shows clear 
evidence of the  assum ption's violation. To test for autocorrelation of dis­
turbances, Breusch-Godfrey test is employed in R  for panel da ta . The null 
hypothesis is rejected again w ith a  p-value lower than  5% indicating th a t 
there exists autocorrelation in error term s.
For large sample sizes such as the  one in th is paper, one common solu­
tion to  th is problem is using heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation robust 
statistics which make the  standard  errors and confidence intervals valid.
After fitting the model in R , the regression results for Fixed Effects are 
presented in Table 2. Since FE  employed by the tim e demeaning transform a­
tion drops tim e-invariant variables, bilateral distance and all country-pair or 
individual factors th a t do no t change over the  years do not appear on the  ta ­
ble. Specifically common language, contiguity, colony, common religion and 
the  country pair dummies are om itted. G D P of bo th  host and origin coun­
tries, EU membership and common currency all show statistical significance 
and appear w ith the expected positive sign.
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The economic freedom index is also clearly significant. Its sign indicates 
th a t  several factors representing the economic environment of host coun­
tries are also explaining positively incoming FD I from reporting countries. 
Its  coefficient of 0.021 could be interpreted th a t a  one un it increase of the 
economic freedom index for the  destination country would raise investment 
by 2.1% . This variable indirectly controls for any expected effect especially 
from institutional indicators and tax  related reasons which could have incor­
rectly overestimated the  im pact of money laundering on FD I if no t included 
in the  model.
O ur variable of interest, money laundering shows no statistical signifi­
cance and a  coefficient of -0.043 contradicting Perez e t al. (2012) and Atems 
& Mullen (2016). One issue to  be discussed in th is case is how well does the 
dummy variable capture the effect of money laundering. As stated  in the 
INSCR report of the  US D epartm ent of S tate , the  list of concerning jurisdic­
tions is compiled after assessing vulnerability to  money laundering and the 
significance of the  am ount of crime proceeds which are laundered. Again, 
according to  our source the la tte r should be seen w ith a  degree of skepticism 
because of the  the  difficulty and complexity of distinguishing them  from 
other crime proceeds.
Additionally, an  im portant factor to  be taken into account when inter­
preting the  econometric results for the  entire dataset is the  omission of zero 
values, which is discussed in detail in section 3.4. This could potentially 
make the estim ates inconsistent.
Table 4 displayed in Appendix compares coefficients and their signifi­
cance for Pooled OLS to  Fixed Effects and Random Effects. Time dummies 
and country-pair effects are included in all models. Results from pooled 
OLS indicate a  positive and significant relationship between FD I and money 
laundering while the Random  Effects model dem onstrates an insignificant 
money Laundering variable w ith a  coefficient of 0.08. The former estim ate 
relatively corresponds w ith the conclusions from Perez e t al. (2012) and 
Atems & Mullen (2016) while the la tte r suggest the opposite. However, re­
34
sults from both  Pooled OLS and R E were argued to  be inconsistent a t  the 
beginning of th is section so they cannot be taken as reference.
Lastly, the m ajority of control variables which are constant over tim e seem 
significant and w ith the  expected signs b u t are not of particular interest for 
th is paper.
Table 2: Regression Results - Fixed Effects
Dependent variable
log(fdi)
log(gdp o) 1.077* * *  (0.285)
log(gdp d) 0.676* * *  (0.112)
eu d 0.205* (0.105)
comcur 0.539** (0.242)
ef 0.021*** (0.007)




F  Statistic 124.612***(d f= 1 7 ;6 2 2 2 )
Note: * p < 0.1; * * p < 0.05; * * * p < 0.01
4.2 R obustness check
Final estim ations are performed on two sub-samples of the  dataset to  analyze 
any notable differences in results. The first sample contains only destination 
countries which are listed as developed economies and the  second sample 
includes those listed in the  developing group of economies by CIA (2011). 
The list of developed countries is presented in the  Appendix.
The same statistical tests are performed as for the  bigger dataset. Com­
paring Pooled OLS to  Fixed Effects w ith an  F  -test, a  p-value lower than
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0.05 showed Fixed Effects to  be more adequate. Results from Pooled OLS 
and Random  Effects are also shown in the Appendix for bo th  subsamples. 
Similarly as before, the Hausman test th a t checks the  assum ption of no endo­
geneity among independent variables showed th a t i t  is violated. Therefore, 
we rely on Fixed Effects to  Random  Effects for consistent results in both  
subsamples. Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation - robust estim ates and 
standard  errors are obtained after observing heteroskedasticity and autocor­
relation in bo th  models.
Table 3 compares the  Fixed Effects results of developed and developing 
destinations receiving FD I.
Table 3: Developed destinations VS Developing destinations
Dependent variable: log(fdi)
(1) (2)
log(gdp o) 1.223* * *  (0.376) 0.961** (0.382)
log(gdp d) 0.451* *  (0.178) 0.779*** (0.139)
eu d 0.164 (0.143) 0.228 (0.141)
comcur 0.404* (0.244) 0.712 (0.503)
ef -0.012 (0.011) 0.961** (0.382)
ml 0.289*** (0.079) -0.053 (0.145)
Observations 1,996 5,018
R 2 0.437 0.221
Adjusted R2 0.378 0.112
F  Statistic 82.530*** (df =  17; 1805) 73.468*** (df =  17; 4400)
Note: * p < 0.1; * * p < 0.05; * * * p < 0.01
The confidence intervals are com puted and it  is checked th a t they do not 
overlap. For the  developed sample it  is [0.285; 0.292] while for the  developing 
subset is [-0.247; 0.141].
Again, tim e-invariant control variables are om itted. Referring to  Table
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3, ml shows a  significant estim ate and a  positive coefficient for developed 
economies corresponding to  results of Perez e t al. (2012) and Atems & Mullen 
(2016). The results are incompatible w ith the  ones regarding the  whole list 
of host countries. Interestingly, for destinations which are considered to  be 
more economically advanced and developed, money laundering is evidently a  
reason to  increase the investment position while economic freedoms become
irrelevant as a  factor. The coefficient of the  dummy variable ml may be in­
terpreted with the formula 100[exp(^ j )-1]. On average, m ajor money laun­
dering countries receive roughly 33.5% more FD I stocks than  other countries 
not considered as such.
The coefficient seems rather large to explain the pure money launder­
ing effect on FDI. Therefore it is suspected tha t the variable might act 
as a proxy for other factors. To control for tax  avoidance reasons which 
might not be controlled by the economic freedom index, it is checked th a t 
all countries considered as tax  havens published by Ethical Consumer and 
European Commission are included in the sample. The list is displayed in 
the Appendix.
One explanation for this reference might be th a t more data  could be found 
for 2001-2012 regarding developed countries rather than  for developing ones. 
It should be noted tha t it appears more probable for reporting economies to 
invest less or not at all in developing countries.
Lastly, it is not uncommon for many developed countries to be considered 
m ajor money laundering centers by the US D epartm ent of State throughout 
the time interval 2001-2012. A great proportion of the th irty  jurisdictions 
listed by CIA in the group of developed countries are of prim ary concern 
regarding money laundering activities. Also, if we refer to the correlations 
plot from Figure 2, there seems to be a positive association of destination 
G D P and money laundering.
On the other hand, for FD I being transfered to developing destinations, 
results demonstrate a different inference. The money laundering variable 
proves to be statistically insignificant. This shows th a t the reporting coun­
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tries investing in host economies w ithout a  high level of development are 
no t motivated by money laundering. One highly im portant factor explain­
ing FD I to  developing economies is the  index of economic freedoms.
To briefly summarize, the  im portance of money laundering in determining 
FD I outward stocks is dubious and statistically no t convincing. The results 
ought to  be seen w ith hesitation due to  m ajor differences between the  two 
subsamples, d a ta  availability for each of them  and other possible factors not 
controlled for.
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C o n c lu s io n
The goal of th is thesis is to  investigate the  effect of money laundering on 
foreign direct investment positions and determine whether i t  has a  signif­
icant im pact on them . Its  contribution lies in employing a  gravity model 
approach of FD I and adding the  money laundering dummy variable to  esti­
m ate its effect. Moreover, evidence is obtained for a  more recent period than  
past investigations and for advanced European reporting economies. Results 
are additionally inspected for two subsamples of destinations officially cat­
egorized by their level of economic progress in developed and developing 
economies.
Obtained results indicate th a t overall, investors from origin countries are 
no t motivated by money laundering to  increase their FD I positions. This 
conclusion differs only for the  sample of developed destinations which repre­
sents approximately 30% of the  available dataset. For th is particular group 
of countries, money laundering is a  significant determ inant of FD I. O n aver­
age, money laundering centers receive 33.5% more FD I th an  the  rest of the 
countries. Traditional determ inants such as geographical factors, cultural 
similarities and economic freedoms of destination economies also consider­
ably explain investment decisions.
An im portant rem ark to  be added regarding results is th a t  they remain 
valid only for the  6 reporting countries which are considered highly devel­
oped European economies. As mentioned in th is thesis several tim es, the 
effect of money laundering is highly challenging and complex to  be quanti­
fied correctly. I t  should be pointed out th a t  except the  existing variables, 
other not captured factors could possibly contribute to  the  effect of money 
laundering on FD I or the money laundering dummy could be influenced by 
unobserved factors no t included in the  model.
Lastly, the  omission of zero values as well unobserved tim e-variant factors 
m ight have a  considerable effect on estim ates and possible inconsistencies 
should be paid regard to . Unfortunately, these issues are not yet resolved 
due to  lim ited econometric tools and are left to  future research.
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log(distw) - 0.566* * *  (0.068) - 0.614*** (0.067)
log(gdp o) 0.283* * *  (0.069) 1.077*** (0.285) 0.250*** (0.072)
log(gdp d) 1.016*** (0.031) 0.676*** (0.112) 1.011*** (0.031)
comlang off 1.153*** (0.191) 1.234*** (0.219)
comrelig 0.781*** (0.233) 0.863*** (0.241)
colony 1.152*** (0.173) 1.103*** (0.206)
contig - 0.052 (0.224) 0.067 (0.243)
eu d 0.475*** (0.159) 0.205* (0.105) 0.247** (0.097)
comcur 0.354* (0.183) 0.539** (0.242) 0.604*** (0.208)
ef 0.041*** (0.005) 0.021*** (0.007) 0.031*** (0.005)
ml 0.228** (0.112) - 0.043 (0.128) 0.080 (0.101)
C onstant - 25.709*** (2.116) - 23.916*** (2.209)
Observations 7,014 7,014 7,014
R 2 0.753 0.254 0.353
Adjusted R2 0.752 0.159 0.351
F  Statistic 968.412*** 124.612*** 172.359***
Note: * p < 0.1; * * p < 0.05; * * * p < 0.01








log(distw) - 0.796* * *  (0.111) - 0.692*** (0.123)
log(gdp o) 0.335* * *  (0.110) 1.223*** (0.376) 0.445*** (0.123)
log(gdp d) 0.930*** (0.058) 0.451** (0.178) 0.874*** (0.064)
comlang off 0.586* (0.309) 0.826** (0.343)
comrelig 1.080** (0.447) 1.213** (0.499)
colony 1.073*** (0.272) 1.271*** (0.345)
contig - 0.041 (0.270) - 0.047 (0.308)
eu d 0.501** (0.226) 0.164 (0.143) 0.129 (0.136)
comcur 0.240 (0.214) 0.404* (0.244) 0.372* (0.221)
ef 0.086*** (0.012) - 0.012 (0.011) 0.005 (0.010)
ml 0.455** (0.201) 0.289*** (0.079) 0.368*** (0.116)
C onstant - 26.846*** (3.356) - 23.319*** (3.433)
Observations 1,996 1,996 1,996
R 2 0.741 0.437 0.464
Adjusted R2 0.738 0.378 0.458
F  Statistic 256.599*** 82.530*** 77.413***
Note: * p < 0.1; * * p < 0.05; * * * p < 0.01








log(distw) - 0.436* * *  (0.083) - 0.476*** (0.085)
log(gdp o) 0.290* * *  (0.086) 0.961** (0.382) 0.213** (0.090)
log(gdp d) 1.090*** (0.036) 0.779*** (0.139) 1.053*** (0.038)
comlang off 1.469*** (0.244) 1.475*** (0.284)
comrelig 0.561** (0.275) 0.775*** (0.281)
colony 0.988*** (0.210) 0.989*** (0.256)
contig 0.157 (0.312) 0.563* (0.338)
eu d 0.632*** (0.242) 0.228 (0.141) 0.285** (0.133)
comcur 1.737** (0.829) 0.712 (0.503) 0.831 (0.509)
ef 0.038*** (0.006) 0.025*** (0.008) 0.030*** (0.006)
ml 0.101 (0.129) - 0.053 (0.145) 0.045 (0.114)
C onstant - 28.304*** (2.640) - 24.967*** (2.801)
Observations 5,018 5,018 5,018
R 2 0.646 0.221 0.283
Adjusted R2 0.645 0.112 0.280
F  Statistic 414.631*** 73.468*** 88.981***
Note: * p < 0.1; * * p < 0.05; * * * p < 0.01
List of developed countries (D C) reported by CIA (2011):
A ustralia, A ustria, Belgium, C anada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan , Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slove­
nia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Singapore, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States
Tax havens list:
Anguilla, A ruba, Baham as, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Is­
lands, Cayman Islands,Cook Islands, Curasao, Cyprus, Delaware (US), Do­
minica, Gibraltar,Guernsey, Guyana, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jer­
sey, Liberia,Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Macao, M alta, Marshall Islands, Mau- 
ritius,Monaco, M ontserrat, Nauru,Netherlands, Nevada (US), Samoa, San 
Marina, Seychelles Singapore, St. K itts and Nevis St. V incent&  Grenadines, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Turks and Caicos Islands, US Virgin Islands, Wyoming 
(US)
